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I. INTRODUCTION
When Gonzales v. Carhart' ("Carhart I") was announced, reac-
tions were anything but soft-spoken or ambivalent. The case certainly
struck a nerve; the decision was described on one hand as "a shocking
setback,"2 "irrational, voyeuristic, piggish and without redeeming le-
gal value,"3 and "alarming,"4 but on the other hand as "a very historic
decision"5 and "incredibly important."6 Despite the outcry it inspired,
the decision's effect on actual abortions performed will be minimal. In
Carhart II, the Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the Eighth
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals and upheld the Partial Birth
Abortion Act of 2003. 7 The Act bars women from obtaining a partial-
birth abortion,8 a procedure which accounts for only .17% of all abor-
tions, or approximately 2,232 annually, in the United States. 9 Fur-
ther, the Act is unlikely to actually preclude these abortions-rather
1. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
2. Press Release, Erin Kiernon, Planned Parenthood, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds
Federal Abortion Ban (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news
room/press-releases/supreme-court-14047.htm.
3. Jefferson Madison Center for Religious Liberty, Gonzales v. Carhart: "Carhart is
the Dread Scott Decision of Our Time" (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.jmcenter.org/
blogs/20070425-Gonzales v -Carhart.html.
4. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. Press Release, Roberta Combs, Christian Coalition of America, Christian Coali-
tion of America Says "Roe v. Wade" Endangered with Today's Supreme Court
Victory Upholding Partial Birth Abortion Ban (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.cc.org/
pressrelease/christian coalition-americasays quotroe.v..wadequot endangered
_today039ssupremecourt_.
6. James Dobson, Focus on the Family, We Thank God for This Victory (Apr. 19,
2007), http://listen.family.orgmiscdaily/A000000461.cfm.
7. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)).
8. Id. at 1621-23. Partial-birth abortion is a colloquial term for a late term abortion
procedure. Partial-birth is a variation of the more common dilation and evacua-
tion (D & E) procedure and is known alternately as dilation and extraction (D &
X) or intact D & E. The primary difference between the D & E and D & X proce-
dures is how the fetus is removed. During a D & X, the doctor intends to remove
the fetus intact; in contrast, a doctor removes the fetus through many passes
during a D & E procedure. A more thorough description of these and other abor-
tion procedures can be found in id. at 1621-23.
9. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the
United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 6, 13 (2003),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrhlfull/3500603.pdf. Although
the Court suggests that there is no definitive measure of the percentage of abor-
tions that involve D & X, the aforementioned study indicates that the number is
low.
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it will merely ensure that an alternate abortion procedure will be uti-
lized.1 0 Carhart IIs real significance lies in the explanations and de-
tails of the majority opinion. Within the opinion, the Court
rationalized and clarified, as well as clouded, previous jurisprudence
on medical uncertainty, the appropriate standard of review, and the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
This Note focuses on what Carhart II signals for future legal analy-
sis in determining when an abortion law is facially invalid. Noting
that the standard for facial review in abortion cases remained unde-
cided, the Carhart II majority suggested two possible standards.']
The Court could apply the traditional rule that a law is facially invalid
if "no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be
valid."12  Alternatively, the Court could apply a standard
which facially invalidates a law if it imposes an undue burden "in a
large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant."13 However, in-
stead of selecting a test, the Court followed the famous advice of Yogi
Berra: "when you come to a fork in the road, take it."14 The Court
determined a facial challenge to the Act failed either test, and there-
fore stated, "We need not resolve that debate."15
This Note examines the resolution that the Court should adopt in
the future. Part II provides background on the overbreadth doctrine,
including a historical overview of the doctrine's application in its
traditional context of the First Amendment. Further, Part II provides
a brief review of abortion precedents with an emphasis on facial chal-
lenges and concludes with an analysis of the key holdings and ratio-
nalizations in Carhart I. In Part III, the Note analyzes the merits of
the possible abortion overbreadth tests. Section A will analyze which
test is superior, based on congruency with prior precedent and proba-
ble effects. Within this section, arguments for traditional overbreadth
are considered and found to be unconvincing in the abortion context.
This section also observes the inappropriate shift in power favoring
the judicial branch that the overbreadth doctrine would cause within
the abortion arena. This section ends with a discussion of the grave
difficulty that would arise in applying a large-fraction test and the
10. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1639. Other available procedures include D & E and
medical induction. The majority opinion notes that women will still have availa-
ble abortion methods: "D & E and intact D & E are not the only second-trimester
abortion methods. Doctors also may abort a fetus through medical induction....
Doctors turn to two other methods of second-trimester abortion, hysterotomy and
hysterectomy, only in emergency situations because they carry increased risk of
complications." Id. at 1623.
11. Id. at 1639.
12. Id. (citations omitted).
13. Id.
14. YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT!: INSPIRATION AND
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL'S GREATEST HEROES (Hyperion 2001).
15. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
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risk that such a test might tempt the Justices to adhere to their moral
beliefs rather than the law. Finally, section B suggests which stan-
dard the Roberts Court would likely adopt if faced with such a deci-
sion, based on a review of the Justices' previous remarks and
decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background of the Overbreadth Doctrine
Under traditional challenges to the constitutionality of a statute,
the deciding court issues either a facial or an as-applied holding. 16 An
as-applied holding invalidates the law only as it pertains to a particu-
lar individual and their unique circumstances.17 In considering an as-
applied challenge, a court asks only whether the particular person's
activities were constitutionally protected.1s If the individual's rights
were violated, then the breadth of the statute may be limited by sim-
ply severing the unconstitutional portions.' 9 Alternatively, a facial
challenge questions the constitutionality of the statute in its en-
tirety.20 In sum, statutes that are structurally unconstitutional typi-
cally require facial invalidation, while statutes that violate individual
rights commonly require as-applied invalidation. 2 1
Two types of facial invalidation have evolved as well.22 The first
reflects a "traditional" facial challenge, typically based on a structural
issue in the statute. The statutory defect under such a challenge is
not the statute's applicability but rather the statutory terms them-
selves.23 The second type is the overbreadth facial challenge, which
originally only applied to First Amendment cases.2 4 An overbreadth
challenge suggests a statute has too many unconstitutional applica-
tions, and they outweigh the constitutional applications to such an ex-
16. Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 360 (1998).
17. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 8.
18. Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of Alle-
giance, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 162, 170 (2006); Monaghan, supra note 17, at
8.
19. David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2005).
The severed unconstitutional part of the law would be removed; therefore, it
could no longer be applied to the person who brought the challenge or anyone
else.
20. Id.
21. Meier, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 171.
22. Isserles, supra note 16, at 363-64.
23. Id. at 363-65. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), serves as one ex-
ample where the Court held that the challenged law was facially unconstitutional
because Congress had insufficient power to create the regulation under the Com-
merce Clause.
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
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tent that the statute ought to be held facially unconstitutional. 25
Notably, a court must hypothesize possible applications of a statute to
determine the relation of unconstitutional applications to all applica-
tions. 26 Thus, the court is using an "empirical" test to create a ratio of
the applications.
27
The traditional facial challenge standard was announced in United
States v. Salerno:28 "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenge must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid."2 9 To invalidate a statute under the
Salerno standard, a court must not be able to hypothesize any possible
constitutional applications of the statute. 30 Furthermore, an individ-
ual litigant's constitutional rights must have been burdened; other-
wise, the no-set-of-circumstances test would fail. This means the
litigant must also have a valid as-applied challenge, relying on his or
her own constitutional rights. The stringent nature of the Salerno
test indicates why courts tend to facially invalidate laws only for
structural defects, which apply to all persons under the statute.3 1 De-
spite strong criticism from both judges and commentators, the Salerno
rule continues to govern facial challenges. 3 2
In contrast, under an overbreadth challenge, the litigant does not
argue that his or her actions were protected. 33 Instead, the litigant
argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to "too many"
25. Isserles, supra note 16, at 365-66.
26. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
27. Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 113, 131-32
(2005) ("The court must ponder the numerous situations in which the statute in
question might be applied, weigh the speech and state interests in each fact pat-
tern and 'predict' how those competing interests would be resolved if actually
litigated, and then calculate the empirical relationship between the number of
applications that would be constitutional and those that would be
unconstitutional.).
28. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
29. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
30. Isserles, supra note 16, at 383 ("Salerno's test for judging facial claims on the
merits seems to invite, indeed to require, consideration of the very hypothetical
claims ... a litigant can overcome Salerno's facial challenge test only by a Hercu-
lean effort at hypothetical litigation: a demonstration that each and every appli-
cation of the statute would be unconstitutional.").
31. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 133 (stating that the facial invalidity is
due to a defect in the statute, without regard to the statute's applications).
32. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996)
(Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari) ("[T]he dicta in
Salerno 'does not accurately characterize the standard for deciding facial chal-
lenges,' and 'neither accurately reflects the Court's practice with respect to facial
challenges, nor is it consistent with a wide array of legal principles.'" (quoting
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 236, 238 (1994))).
33. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
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people that are not presently before the court, and because of the num-
ber of these unconstitutional applications, the law should be
stricken.34 Thus, the overbreadth doctrine allows for third-party
standing because the litigant is defending the rights of others not
before the court.35 The overbreadth doctrine also has less stringent
rules for facially invalidating a statute. Even if there is a constitu-
tional application of the statute, an overbreadth challenge allows in-
validation of a statute as long as the statute is too broad. A better
understanding of the intricacies of the overbreadth doctrine can be
gained from the following review of overbreadth case law.
B. History of the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine began with the 1940 Supreme Court
case, Thornhill v. Alabama.36 Thornhill noted that free speech rights
are inherently important to democratic government as democracy re-
quires the free exchange of ideas and an educated public. 3 7 To justify
its actions, the Court spawned the overbreadth doctrine by stating
that while the petitioner could not argue that his rights had been vio-
lated, he could "complain of the sweeping regulations."38 Although
the Court did not refer to its newly created doctrine as one of over-
breadth, it applied third-party standing and allowed the litigant to
challenge the sweep of the rule against hypothetical litigants rather
than him.3 9
In 1973, the Court further clarified and narrowed the overbreadth
doctrine in another free speech case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma.40
Broadrick noted that "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
34. Isserles, supra note 16, at 366.
35. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 621; Isserles, supra note 16, at 369.
36. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
11 (1981), initially recognized Thornhill as the origin of the overbreadth doctrine
by calling it the "fountainhead of the overbreadth doctrine itself." Many commen-
tators have subsequently concurred with this assessment. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991); Meier, Broad
Attack, supra note 27, at 127; Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger
Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031,
1038-39 (1983).
37. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95-97 ("The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that
men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may
be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free
government. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of
free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread
political and economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted
and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion.").
38. Id. at 96.
39. Id.
40. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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legitimate sweep."4 1 Broadrick changed the doctrine by requiring a
law to not only be overbroad but also substantially overbroad. Thus,
Broadrick requires courts to hypothesize about the sweeping effects of
a law, estimate the likely number of unconstitutional applications,4 2
decide at what point this fraction becomes too large,4 3 and determine
whether the fraction of overbroad applications for the statute under
review has surpassed the "substantial" threshold.
In reaching its holding, the Court noted that the overbreadth doc-
trine was "manifestly, strong medicine," and that it should be used
"sparingly and as a last resort."44 The Court also pointed out that the
overbreadth doctrine is a departure from traditional judicial tenets
that will only be entertained in the First Amendment context.4 5 Fur-
ther, the overbreadth doctrine should only be used for facial invalida-
tion if partial invalidation by severing the unconstitutional part of the
statute is impossible.46 Although the Court has heard many over-
breadth cases since Broadrick, there has been no substantial change
to the basic structure of the doctrine. 4 7 Thus, the overbreadth doc-
trine remains alive and well.
C. Overbreadth Doctrine Outside of the First Amendment
1. The Court's Words
Until recently, the Court has been relatively clear in its language
that the overbreadth doctrine cannot be used outside the First
41. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
42. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 131.
43. Id.
44. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court initially limited the effect of the overbreadth doctrine not only by
confining it to free speech cases but also by requiring partial invalidation if possi-
ble. "The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the
First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is
totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally
protected expression." Id.
47. Notable cases have held laws are substantially overbroad. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (holding that a law banning "adult-ori-
ented materials" was substantially overbroad); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (holding that an airport regulation which
banned all free speech rights within the airport was substantially overbroad). On
the other hand, a number of cases have found that the laws were not overbroad
using the Broadrick test. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (uphold-
ing a statute making it illegal to hand out pamphlets within one hundred feet of a
nursing home without proper consent); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
(holding that a statute restricting the promotion of child pornography was not
substantially overbroad). Since Broadrick, the Court has also found that over-
breadth does not apply to commercial speech, but the Broadrick substantial over-
breadth test did not change. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Amendment. Despite the Court's specific enunciations, the Court's
application of the overbreadth doctrine appears to be anything but
clear or limited solely to the First Amendment. In 1984, the Court
plainly stated, "outside the limited First Amendment context, a crimi-
nal statute may not be attacked as overbroad."48 Again, in 1987, the
Court said, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment."4 9 However, a distinction
has existed between what the Court has said regarding the applica-
tion of the overbreadth doctrine and what it has done. Recently, the
Court has conceded this contradiction. 50
2. The Court's Actions
In 2004, the Court finally divulged that they had been using the
overbreadth doctrine outside of the First Amendment:51 "[Wie have
recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though
not necessarily using that term) in relatively few settings."52 Specifi-
cally, the Court acknowledged having applied the overbreadth doc-
trine outside the First Amendment in three distinct areas: the right to
travel,53 abortion,54 and legislation under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.55 After listing these "few" applications, the Court
said that overbreadth invalidation is not applicable outside these four
contexts. 56 The Court's acknowledgment that it has long applied the
overbreadth doctrine outside the First Amendment did not come as a
surprise, as the dichotomy between what the Court has said and done
with regard to the doctrine has long been recognized.5 7 The Court's
confession may not have been complete, however. One commentator
58
contends there are numerous other legal arenas in which the Court
48. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
49. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
50. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 609.
53. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding that a law restricting the
right to travel based on political affiliations was too broad).
54. Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 938-46 (2000) (holding that a law restricting partial-
birth abortion was overbroad and vague).
55. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997) (holding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993), exceeded Congress'
power under the Constitution).
56. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004). The four contexts include the
aforementioned right to travel, abortion, legislation under section five, as well as
free speech.
57. John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53,
79 (2004); Doff, supra note 32, at 282 ("[Tlhis discussion demonstrates the gross
overstatement of the Court's pronouncement in Salerno that it has 'not recognized
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.'"
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
58. Decker, supra note 57, at 81-84, 92-94.
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has applied the overbreadth doctrine, including the right to privacy
against surveillance,59 the right to privacy regarding contraceptives,
60
the right to vote,6 1 and the right to raise children.
62
D. Abortion Overbreadth Hypothetical
The concept of overbreadth in abortion can be difficult to concep-
tualize. A simplified hypothetical may help to clarify how overbreadth
works in abortion. Suppose that a legislature enacts a law banning all
post-viability abortions without any exceptions for women's health.
Further assume that a court would use Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey63 as precedent to hold that an exception
for the health of the woman must exist for post-viability abortion
restrictions.
Now suppose Peggy has carried a fetus for twenty-eight weeks and
is suffering no medical complications due to her pregnancy. She
wants to have an abortion due to financial hardships, but is unable to
obtain an abortion because the law banned all post-viability abortions.
Peggy would have two potential types of challenges: as-applied and
facial. If she files an as-applied challenge, she would argue that her
rights had been constitutionally violated. Peggy would lose this suit,
however. Following the Casey precedent, a court would find that her
right to privacy had not been violated because the fetus was viable,
and she was suffering no health problems. Consequently, a legisla-
ture could legally restrict her right to privacy.
Now suppose that Peggy files a facial challenge. Instead of arguing
that her rights had been violated, she claims that the law was over-
broad. Based on the overbreadth doctrine, Peggy claims that the stat-
ute will unconstitutionally burden a large fraction of women to whom
the statute is relevant. The numerator of the fraction would consist of
women to whom the law unconstitutionally burdens; in this scenario,
the numerator would consist of women who require abortions for
health concerns after viability. The denominator would be made up of
all relevant women with a court having discretion in choosing the
framing. The court would then be left with the task of determining if
59. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that a statute allowing eaves-
dropping by the police without sufficient reason was unconstitutionally overbroad
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law restricting con-
traceptive use violated the right of marital privacy).
61. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (holding that a statute requiring
voters to demonstrate comprehension of state and federal constitutions violated
the Fifteenth Amendment).
62. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that a law that allowed the court
to grant visitation rights to people despite the mother's wishes violated her due
process rights).
63. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
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this fraction was large. If so, Peggy would win the facial challenge,
and the law would be struck down. Thus, Peggy may have made a
successful challenge based on the law's unacceptable effects, not to
her, but to other women. However, note that under the traditional
Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test for facial invalidation, Peggy
would lose her challenge because her own situation would be a circum-
stance where the law was valid. This scenario indicates that the de-
termination of whether to apply the traditional facial challenge or
overbreadth to abortion cases will have real, demonstrable effects.
E. Abortion History Examining the Use of Overbreadth
A thorough review of abortion cases, with an eye to the over-
breadth doctrine, shows that courts have applied the doctrine to abor-
tion cases since Roe v. Wade in 1973.64 Roe, the landmark case
invalidating a Texas statute prohibiting abortion based on substantive
due process, noted that the lower court held that the statute was an
"overbroad infringement on the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment
rights."6 5 Although not explicitly relying on the overbreadth doctrine,
the Court wrote that the statute "sweeps too broadly" in restricting
abortions for the woman's health.6 6 Justice Scalia and former Chief
Justice White subsequently reflected that Roe "seemingly employed
an 'overbreadth' approach-though without mentioning the term and
without analysis."67 Thus, Roe may be read as an implicit application
of the overbreadth doctrine.
In 1990, the Court explicitly referenced the Salerno rule in Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health.68 In reversing a circuit court's
ruling that a statute requiring parental notification was unconstitu-
tional, the Court stated, "because appellees are making a facial chal-
lenge to a statute, they must show that 'no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."' 69 Despite the Court's state-
ments, the use of the Salerno no-set-of-circumstances standard for
abortion did not last long and has not been used since.
The next landmark abortion case was Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey7O in 1992. Casey reaffirmed
Roe7 1 and found that a statute requiring spousal notification imposed
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Id. at 122.
66. Id. at 164; Decker, supra 57, at 86.
67. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).
68. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
69. Id. at 514 (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. Id. at 869. The majority indicated that it affirmed Roe's central holding, stating
"[it is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original decision, and
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an "undue burden" on women seeking abortions.7 2 The Court specifi-
cally rejected the trimester framework of Roe, stating that it was not
essential to the holding of Roe, and instead utilized a new undue bur-
den standard.7 3 The respondents based their argument in part on the
Salerno standard and argued that the law had many constitutional
applications.74 Instead of applying Salerno to decide whether an un-
due burden existed, the Court used the large-fraction test: if "in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion[, iut is an undue burden, and therefore invalid."75 To deter-
mine the fraction, the Court repeatedly narrowed the number of wo-
men to whom it deemed the law to be relevant until the fraction was
equal to one. 7 6 The Court made both the numerator and denominator
equal the number of women to whom the law was a substantial obsta-
cle. 77 The Court reasoned that it should only analyze the law's effect
on the women it restricted. 78
Although the Casey majority never explicitly admitted to applying
the overbreadth doctrine in their analysis, that is, in effect, exactly
what they did.79 Indeed, the similarity between the overbreadth doc-
trine and the Casey large-fraction test is striking. Under each, a court
we do so today. . . . [I]t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some
freedom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe
was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate." Id.
72. Id. at 898.
73. Id. at 873.
74. Id. at 894.
75. Id. at 895.
76. Id. at 894-95 ("By selecting as the controlling class women who wish to obtain
abortions, rather than all women or all pregnant women, respondents in effect
concede that [the statute] must be judged by reference to those for whom it is an
actual rather than an irrelevant restriction. Of course, as we have said, [the stat-
ute's] real target is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions
identified by the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to
notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the
statutory exceptions to the notice requirement.").
77. Id. at 894-95.
78. Id. at 894.
79. Numerous commentators have opined that the Court used the doctrine or at least
a "functional equivalent." Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn
Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 356 (2006); see also Decker, supra note 57, at 104
(rationalizing that the large-fraction rule "may be nothing more than another
way to say the same thing" as substantial overbreadth); Dorf, supra note 32,
275-76 (indicating that the Casey Court applied reasoning similar to overbreadth
and stating, "[tlhe Casey plurality thus applied 'substantial overbreadth' analy-
sis"); Isserles, supra note 16, at 362-63 (writing that the Court used a "test
modeled on the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine"); Kevin Martin, Note,
Stranger in a Strange Land: The Use of Overbreadth in Abortion Jurisprudence,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 173 (1999) (asserting plainly that overbreadth exception
has been extended to abortion jurisprudence).
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must decide whether there is an impermissible fraction of unconstitu-
tional applications out of the total number of possible applications.80
The two tests in practice are merely one test with two names. The
Casey majority even relied upon the potential chilling effect of the
statute-which is a common overbreadth doctrine rationale for invali-
dation-in its analysis: "We must not blind ourselves to the fact that
the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the
safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in
all cases."81
In 2000, the Court addressed the next major facial challenge abor-
tion case, Stenberg v. Carhart ("Carhart r').82 In the decision, the
Court upheld the invalidation of Nebraska's ban on "partial birth"83
abortions, on grounds that the law provided no exception for the
health of the woman and burdened a woman's right to choose the pro-
cedure.8 4 The Court never clarified which test it applied in determin-
ing whether an undue burden existed. However, based on the
majority's rationale, the Carhart I test is a far less demanding test
than Salerno and might possibly be even less rigorous than Casey.8 5
Although Carhart I did not indicate which standard the Court should
80. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 167.
81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. The Court's use of an overbreadth rationale indicates
that the Court responded to similar concerns as those within the First Amend-
ment and indeed came to a similar solution. For a discussion regarding the chil-
ling rationale for the overbreadth doctrine, see Fallon, supra note 36, at 867-70.
82. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
83. The Nebraska statute defined partial-birth abortion as "an abortion procedure in
which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living un-
born child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery. For pur-
poses of this subdivision, the term partially delivers vaginally a living unborn
child before killing the unborn child means deliberately and intentionally deliver-
ing into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure
knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999), invalidated by Carhart 1, 530 U.S. 914. The petitioners
argued that the statute only banned D & X abortions. Contrarily, the Court held
that both D & X and D & E abortions were prohibited by the statute.
84. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930
85. Id. at 929-45. The Court alluded to their rationale throughout the opinion, with-
out ever directly stating what standard it used in reviewing the constitutionality.
The Court stated that its opinion is based on Casey, in holding "Nebraska has not
convinced us that a health exception is 'never necessary to preserve the health of
women.'" Id. at 937-38. The Court appeared to reason that a singular restriction
on a constitutional abortion right is "a large fraction." Justice Thomas, in dis-
sent, argued that the majority never indicated that it applied the large-fraction
test because, in his opinion, "the Nebraska statute easily survives it." Id. at 1020
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Because any Act which survives the Casey large-frac-
tion test must necessarily also survive the Salerno standard, Thomas appeared to
imply that the Court has created a new test altogether.
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use in future abortion cases, it reflected the Court's abandonment of
Salerno.
F. Gonzales v. Carhart
In 2003, in the wake of Carhart I, Congress passed a federal ban8 6
prohibiting "partial-birth"87 abortions. Two facial challenges to the
ban were filed in the United States District Courts for the District of
Nebraska and the Northern District of California.8 8 Both district
courts enjoined the enforcement of the ban, and the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit Courts affirmed.8 9 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
and heard the cases together.90 On April 18, 2007, the Supreme Court
decided the joined cases in Carhart II, holding in a five-four decision
that the ban survived a facial challenge. 9 1
Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion with a detailed analy-
sis of the types of abortion procedures 9 2 and a discussion of the history
leading up to the ban in Carhart II.93 Next, the majority opinion ap-
plied the central tenets of Casey.94 Beginning its analysis, the major-
86. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). As the Carhart
II majority noted, the federal "Act responded to [Carhart I] in two ways. First,
Congress made factual findings.... Second,... the Act's language differs from
that of the Nebraska statute struck down in [Carhart 1]." Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct.
1610, 1624 (2007). Congress decided that the findings of the District Court in
Carhart I were questionable. Id. Congress came to its own findings for the Act
stating that partial-birth abortion was never medically necessary. Id. The Act's
language also includes "anatomical landmarks" to describe the banned procedure
and scienter requirements to prevent criminalization when intent is absent. Id.
at 1627-28.
87. For the purpose of the statute: "the term 'partial-birth abortion' means an abor-
tion in which the person performing the abortion- (A) deliberately and inten-
tionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and (B) performs the overt act,
other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus."
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1).
88. Carhart 1I, 127 S. Ct. at 1619-20.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1618. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority decision for the Court. Id. Jus-
tices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined the majority opinion. Id. Justice
Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion with which Justice Scalia joined, and
Justice Ginsburg authored the dissent with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
joining. Id.
92. Id. at 1620-23.
93. Id. at 1623-26.
94. Id. at 1626-27, 1639. The opinion seems to indicate that the Court did not revisit
the validity of Casey but only applied its principles. Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito
did not indicate that they believed Casey was incorrectly decided. However,
Thomas wrote, with Scalia joining, that "the Court's abortion jurisprudence, in-
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ity determined that the Act's scope was limited to D & X abortions and
did not apply to D & E abortions, despite the respondents' argu-
ments.95 Further, the majority reasoned that the "anatomical
landmarks"9 6 contained within the law as well as the overt act 9 7 and
scienter 98 requirements prevented the Act from encompassing D & E
abortions. 99 The majority then stated that the Act was not invalid
based on vagueness because it provided "doctors 'of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."'100 Un-
like the Nebraska Act, which prohibited a fetus being delivered a
"substantial portion" before an abortion, the majority held that the
federal Act contained a sufficient division between lawful and unlaw-
ful acts by using anatomical landmarks.O1 The majority reasoned
that the landmarks along with the intent requirement prevented the
statute from being overly vague. ' 0 2
After determining the statute was not void for vagueness or over-
breadth, the majority held that the Act did not impose an undue bur-
den.'0 3 The majority decided that the lack of an exception for the
woman's health was not fatal to the Act because medical uncertainty
existed over whether the banned procedure was ever necessary to pro-
tect the health of the woman.' 0 4 Next, the majority addressed
"whether the Act can stand when this medical uncertainty per-
sists."105 The majority cited cases indicating that the Court had given
legislatures discretion when medical uncertainty existed in holding
that "[mledical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legisla-
cluding Casey and Roe v. Wade, has no basis in the Constitution." Id. at 1639
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 1627 (majority opinion).
96. The anatomical landmarks are included in the definition of partial-birth abor-
tion. See supra note 87.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(B) (2003) specifically states "performs the overt act, other
than the completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered fetus."
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) states that the act of partially delivering the fetus must
be "deliberately and intentionally" to be considered a partial-birth abortion. The
Court held that if the fetus was delivered past the anatomical landmarks by "ac-
cident or inadvertence, the Act is inapplicable." Carhart H, 127 S. Ct. at 1628
(citation omitted). Further, the Court stated that "the fetus must have been de-
livered 'for the purpose of performing an overt act that the [doctor] knows will kill
[it].'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(B)) (alterations in original).
99. Carhart H, 127 S.Ct. at 1627-28.
100. Id. at 1628 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 102, 108 (1972)).
101. Id. The majority plainly concluded its reasoning stating, 'Doctors performing D
& E will know that if they do not deliver a living fetus to an anatomical landmark
they will not face criminal liability." Id.
102. Id. ("[T]he act cannot be described as 'a trap for those who act in good faith.'"
(quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979))).
103. Id. at 1632.
104. Id. at 1635-38.
105. Id. at 1636.
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tive power." 1o6 Further considerations including alternative mea-
sures of abortion also influenced the majority in its decision to uphold
the statute. 0 7 In reaching its decision, the majority also acknowl-
edged the government's legitimate interests, including the integrity
and ethics of the medical profession,OS the potential life of the fe-
tus,lo9 valuation of human life,110 and emotional well-being of the
woman."'
The final section of the majority decision addressed facial chal-
lenges and the burden that a party asking for a facial challenge must
overcome."1 2 The opinion noted that facial challenges should not have
been pursued in the present case because the case "can be better
quantified and balanced" in an as-applied challenge.113 Even though
the Casey rule had been recently accepted and applied, the majority
questioned the proper standard and referenced the two types of "bur-
dens" which have been used by the Court in abortion cases. 1 14 The
majority cited Akron 115 for the Salerno no-set-of circumstances test
and Casey116 for the large-fraction test.' 1 7 By noting instances where
the Supreme Court has used both rules, the majority indicated that
the appropriate standard remains uncertain. 1 18 Holding that the
Carhart II challenge failed under either test,1 19 the majority then
plainly stated, "[wie need not resolve that debate."120 More specifi-
106. Id. at 1637.
107. Id. The majority rationalized that the district courts' findings of other safe abor-
tion procedures were important to the decision. The Court also recognized that
the Act prohibited the delivery of a living fetus and that an injection could likely
kill a fetus before the procedure. Id. Therefore, the doctor could still perform the
abortion if necessary.
108. Id. at 1633 ("ITIhe state has a 'legitimate concern for maintaining high standards
of professional conduct' .. . ." (quoting Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,
451 (1954))).
109. Id. (indicating that the Court had previously undervalued the government inter-
est in potential life).
110. Id. at 1633-34. The majority described Congress's finding that the D & X abor-
tion had a "disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant" and "that it
was concerned with drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and
infanticide." Id. (citation omitted). With these statements, the Court and Con-
gress indicated government's interest in preventing any possible devaluation in
human life.
111. Id. at 1634 ("While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude that some women come to regret their choice to abort
infant life they once created and sustained.").
112. Id. at 1638-39.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1639.
115. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
116. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
117. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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cally, the majority held that the Act was not unconstitutional in a
"large fraction of relevant cases," let alone in all circumstances as re-
quired by Salerno or Akron. 12 1 Thus, having decided the Act survived
any facial challenge, the majority set aside the question of which test
was best, reiterating that it does not "resolve questions" unless neces-
sary to decide the case at bar.122 Despite upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Act, the majority opinion noted that the Act might
be susceptible to as-applied challenges under appropriate circum-
stances. 123
A terse concurring opinion, authored by Justice Thomas and joined
by Justice Scalia, made two noteworthy points.124 Justice Thomas
noted that although he joined the majority opinion, he believed that
the Court accepted incorrect precedent cases. 12 5 He reiterated his be-
lief that Casey and Roe, as well as the current abortion jurisprudence,
are not rooted in the Constitution. 12 6 Second, Justice Thomas stated
that the respondents did not argue that the Act was void under the
Commerce Clause, so the Court did not consider it.127 Justice
Thomas's mention of the Commerce Clause when the issue was not
before the Court seems to indicate that he believed that Congress ex-
ceeded its power under the Constitution.128
121. Id.
122. Id. ("It is neither our obligation nor within our traditional institutional role to
resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that
might develop. It would indeed be undesirable for this Court to consider every
conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex
and comprehensive legislation.").
123. Id. The majority added a caveat to the invitation of as-applied challenges stating,
"[n]o as-applied challenge need be brought if the prohibition in the Act threatens
a woman's life because the Act already contains a life exception." Id.
124. Id. at 1639-40 (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1640.
128. An alternative possibility is that Thomas was preemptively stating that the law
was a constitutional use of the Commerce Clause before criticism arose. This
possibility seems unlikely, however, due to his predilections. Justice Thomas's
view of the restricted nature of the Commerce Clause can be seen in Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated
commerce originally meant "trade or exchange-not all economic or gainful activ-
ity that has some attenuated connection to trade or exchange." Id. at 58-59.
(citation omitted). A further cue that Justice Thomas was indicating a belief that
Congress did not have the power for the Partial-Birth Abortion Act is his subse-
quent citation in his opinion to Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005)
(Thomas, J. concurring). Within the concurring opinion of Cutter, Thomas stated
that the Court properly declined to analyze Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause because the issue was not raised just as he did in Carhart II. Id. Also in
Cutter, however, Justice Thomas further stated that the statute "may well exceed
Congress' authority under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause."
Id.
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In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that prior abortion prece-
dents have held that a health exception is necessary, and the majority
was incorrect in not requiring a health exception in the Act.129 In con-
trast to the majority's reasoning, the dissent argued that the ambigu-
ity of whether a D & X is ever necessary for the health of the woman
signals the need for the health exception.' 30 The dissent also argued
that medical evidence does in fact indicate that D & X abortions are
sometimes necessary for the health of the woman'31 and that the ma-
jority relied too heavily on "flimsy and transparent justifications" 3 2
and "moral concerns"133 to demonstrate the government's interest in
the fetus. 134
The dissent also criticized the majority's refusal to apply the Casey
standard for facial challenges and alleged that the majority incor-
rectly determined the denominator of the large-fraction test.' 35 Jus-
tice Ginsburg argued that the Court applied the Casey rule "under
identical circumstances" in Carhart I and that the majority provided
no explanation for its failure to follow this precedent.136 Regarding
the proper framing of the large-fraction test, Justice Ginsburg main-
tained that when a woman's health is at risk, the denominator will
always be women to whom a statute is relevant.' 3 7 Therefore, both
the numerator and denominator would be the number of relevant wo-
men, that is, women who would be burdened under the Act. Justice
Ginsburg's interpretation would always make the fraction equal to
one when the health of the woman is involved.138 The dissent also
argued that the majority's encouragement of as-applied challenges en-
dangers women's health because it would require women to wait on
the judicial process.' 3 9
III. ANALYSIS
As previously noted, the Court has a long history of applying the
overbreadth doctrine in cases outside the First Amendment.14o In-
129. Carhart H, 127 S. Ct. at 1641-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1644-46.
132. Id. at 1646.
133. Id. at 1647.
134. Id. at 1646-49.
135. Id. at 1650-51.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1651.
138. Id. at 1651 n.10 ("There is, in short, no fraction because the numerator and de-
nominator are the same: The health exception reaches only those cases where a
woman's health is at risk. Perhaps for this reason, in mandating safeguards for
women's health, we have never before invoked the 'large fraction' test.").
139. Id. at 1651-52.
140. See supra Part II.C.1.
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deed, while the overbreadth doctrine has been applied inconsistently
to abortion cases, the more recent cases have utilized the Casey stan-
dard.141 Yet, ambiguity still exists and leaves courts uncertain of
what standard to apply in abortion cases.14 2 Not only has the Su-
preme Court struggled to choose the correct standard, but circuit
courts also have been unsure.1 4 3 Although lower courts seem to have
generally accepted the Casey standard prior to Carhart II, a stable
standard would aid courts in reviewing facial challenges of abortion
cases.
A. The Court Should Reject Overbreadth in Abortion
Heavy debate exists over whether the overbreadth doctrine should
apply to abortion cases. Previous commentators 14 4 have alternately
argued that overbreadth should145 and should not 146 be applied in
abortion cases. These notes, however, have been limited in their dis-
cussion.147 This Note aspires to fully analyze the application of the
overbreadth doctrine in the abortion context and to persuasively argue
that it is like a pig in a parlor-out of place and useless. The tenet of
this Note is that the Salerno test is the better rule. Contentions
against the Casey overbreadth doctrine will be grouped into three
main categories: (1) arguments that the rationale used for utilizing
the overbreadth doctrine within the First Amendment does not apply
to abortion cases, (2) arguments that the structure of the United
States judiciary and the system of government as a whole are incon-
141. See supra Part II.D.
142. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
143. The uncertainty has been noticed by Justices and commentators alike. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, cited cases indicating that the
Fifth Circuit has applied the Salerno rule, while the Eighth Circuit followed
Casey. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1179
(1996). Leading Cases, Abortion Rights-Remedy for Unconstitutionality, 120
HARv. L. REV. 293, 303 n. 7 (2006) states that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th,
and 10th Circuits seem to have followed the Casey test for abortion, whereas the
4th and 5th Circuits have been inconsistent; Wharton, supra note 79, at 355,
argues that the 5th Circuit has applied Salerno in most cases, while the 4th Cir-
cuit has both rejected Salerno and applied it in abortion cases.
144. The application of the overbreadth doctrine to abortion has not been the main
topic of any law review articles outside of three notes. See infra note 145-46.
145. Skye Gavel, Note, Casey versus Salerno: Determining an Appropriate Standard
for Evaluating the Facial Constitutionality of Abortion Statutes, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1825 (1998); John Christopher Ford, Note, The Casey Standard for Evaluat-
ing Facial Attacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1997).
146. Martin, supra note 79.
147. The notes mentioned, supra notes 145-46, focus on applying the overbreadth ra-
tionale to abortion cases and the ramifications that each standard could have on
women. Analysis regarding the apparent difficulty in applying the Casey stan-
dard and the effect of Casey on the structure of the government are similarly
important considerations that this Note will discuss. See infra Part III.A.2 & 3.
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gruent with the use of overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases, and (3)
arguments that the effects of the facial invalidation tests suggest Sa-
lerno is the better test to apply.
1. Arguments for Applying the Overbreadth Doctrine Are
Unpersuasive
Numerous rationales for the application of the overbreadth doc-
trine to abortion have been offered, and many of them are in fact ex-
tensions of the common First Amendment justifications. The most
often cited reason for the use of the overbreadth doctrine both within
and outside the First Amendment context is the chilling effect ratio-
nale. 14 s Within the First Amendment, the chilling rationale argues
that "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill'
constitutionally protected speech."149 The argument is that people
will just abstain from constitutional speech rather than try to mount
an as-applied challenge to defend their rights because of the cost and
burden of litigation.150 Therefore, many people might not be fully ex-
ercising their constitutionally protected speech rights. The Supreme
Court indicated that society as a whole is damaged because it is "de-
prived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" by the overbroad
laws.151
A second rationale for the overbreadth doctrine is that it encour-
ages legislatures to carefully draft laws. Under this theory, when the
Court holds a law to be facially invalid, it is deterring the legislature
from writing an overbroad law in the future. 152 The Supreme Court
has addressed this rationale, arguing that the overbreadth doctrine
not only protects speech rights after the law is passed but also before
its passage by encouraging the law to be drafted narrowly.' 5 3 Fur-
thermore, the Court believes that courts should make legislatures pay
for their mistakes to encourage careful drafting.154
148. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1074-76 (1997);
Fallon, supra note 36, at 867-70, 884; Doff, supra note 32, 275-76.
149. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hill, supra note 148, at 1073.
153. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1990).
154. Id. at 121 ("Legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amend-
ment without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting overbroad
statutes as they might otherwise be .... Thus, careless drafting cannot be consid-
ered to be cost free based on the power of the courts to eliminate overbreadth by
statutory construction.").
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a. Chilling Rationale in Abortion Cases
The chilling argument has been adopted by proponents of the
Casey rule, who suggest that chilling will occur if there is overbreadth
within the abortion context. 155 Chilling in abortion would include the
concern that women may abstain from having a constitutionally pro-
tected abortion for fear of breaking the law, when they otherwise
would have obtained an abortion. In fact, one commentator argues
that abortion is quite susceptible to the prophylactic effect because
"both the pregnant woman and the necessary medical personnel must
have the courage to disregard the chilling effect."156 Justice Gins-
burg's dissent reflects this argument: "In treating those women, physi-
cians would risk criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment if
they exercise their best judgments as to the safest medical procedure
for their patients." 157
Although this rationale seems plausible, the theory breaks down in
its application. Most Americans probably do not know or understand
the intricacies of current abortion laws158 to the extent that they
would be deterred from seeking an abortion.159 Therefore, if any abor-
tion procedure is available, as remains the case after the Carhart H
opinion, most pregnant women desiring abortions would consult a doc-
tor or reproduction advocacy agency 160 rather than wholesale re-
fraining from seeking such consultation due to a ban on specific
155. Dorf, supra note 32, at 271 ("[Tlhe fact that an abortion can only be carried out
with the aid of a third party-typically a doctor-renders the right to choose an
abortion particularly susceptible to a chilling effect."); Gavel, supra note 145, at
1846; Ford, supra note 145, at 1456.
156. Dorf, supra note 32, at 271.
157. Carhart H, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1652 (2007).
158. No specific study was found describing women's understanding of abortion laws
within the United States. A poll conducted by Columbia Law School found that a
majority of Americans believe that overturning Roe v. Wade would lead to abor-
tions being outlawed when a reversal would only mean that there is no constitu-
tional right to an abortion. To outlaw abortion, states would have to legislatively
ban abortion, which may or may not happen depending on the state. Columbia
Law School, Americans' Knowledge of the U.S. Constitution (May 2002), http://
www2.law.columbia.edu/news/surveys/survey-constitution/factsheet.shtml.
159. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 144 argues four assumptions must be met
for chilling to occur: "First, it requires that citizens have knowledge of what the
law is. Second, it assumes that a citizen who does know the law will refrain from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech because that speech is prohibited
under the overbroad statute. Third, it requires that a citizen be aware of court
decisions that strike down the law as overbroad. Fourth, it assumes that a citi-
zen, aware of the court decision, will now engage in the constitutionally protected
speech previously refrained from." If any one of these criteria is not met, the
overbreadth doctrine will not prevent chilling. The assumptions demonstrate
that citizens must have knowledge of the law, willingness to obey it, and desire to
exercise their rights in full. These assumptions, particularly the two entailing
knowledge, are likely not true for most women.
160. The most common example of an advocate would be Planned Parenthood.
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procedures. A woman desiring an abortion would likely rely on the
doctor's view of the legality of the abortion. As Justice Ginsburg sug-
gests, the doctor would probably be left with the decision of whether
the particular abortion procedure is constitutionally protected or
banned by legislation.161
The issue of prophylaxis then depends on whether doctors would be
chilled by an overbroad statute. If indeed a law is even minimally
overbroad and contains restrictions on constitutionally protected abor-
tions, then doctors may be put into very difficult situations. For exam-
ple, under the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, if a woman were to come to
a doctor in a situation where a D & X abortion would be safer than a D
& E, then the doctor would have the arduous and unenviable task of
deciding whether to follow the letter of the law or to best protect the
woman's health. For three main reasons, this Note argues that the
doctor would most likely perform the abortion in the face of the over-
broad law. First, by knowing the Court's previous rationale, doctors
may be willing to anticipate the Court's decision in discrete cases.
Second, doctors and reproductive advocate agencies were invited by
the Court in Carhart H to bring as-applied challenges. Finally, the
majority indicated that ways around the statute existed.
The majority in Carhart H stated that doctors of reasonable intelli-
gence should be able to correctly apply the Act in question. 16 2 Be-
cause of their experience and superior knowledge, doctors and
advocacy agencies are also likely to be able to determine if an abortion
would be constitutionally banned based on the Court's previous ratio-
nale. Doctors who perform abortions have an incentive to stay abreast
of the laws regarding abortions and therefore know that abortion laws
always protect a woman's health. More specifically, an abortion law
cannot restrict an abortion protecting the health of a woman. 163
161. Carhart 1I, 127 S. Ct. at 1652. By writing that the majority's decision "places
doctors in an untenable position," Justice Ginsburg implies that the ultimate de-
cision of whether to perform the abortion will come down to the doctor.
162. Id. at 1628 (majority opinion) ("The Act provides doctors of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Indeed, it sets forth rela-
tively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct and provides objective criteria to
evaluate whether a doctor has performed a prohibited procedure." (citations and
internal quotations omitted)).
163. Id. at 1635. Recent Supreme Court cases have made clear that a law is unconsti-
tutional if the health of a mother is jeopardized. Citing Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Car-
hart H majority wrote that a law cannot bar a procedure "necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the health of the mother." 127 S. Ct.
at 1635 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court further clarified
that a law is unconstitutional if it subjected women to significant health risks.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). A woman's right not to be sub-
jected to health concerns is one point on which the whole Court could agree. The
dissent also wrote that an abortion should be allowed "in appropriate medical
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Thus, doctors are in the position to know if the abortion law that they
are obligated to follow interferes with protecting the health of the
mother, that the law could not be enforced. Based on their medical
experience, doctors should also be able to determine if the D & E pro-
cedure might put the woman's health in jeopardy, whereas the D & X
procedure would be safe. Hence, a doctor likely would feel secure in
performing the abortion in this case, even though the doctor would be
making this decision at his peril due to the statutory violation. An
argument could certainly be made that doctors would not perform the
abortions for fear of sanction or litigation costs in protecting their con-
stitutional rights. It seems more likely, however, that, if put in such a
difficult spot, the doctor would protect the health of the mother with
the knowledge of the possible repercussions.164 The following
paragraphs also discuss why a doctor is unlikely to be placed in this
situation.
Carhart II invited the doctors and agencies to mount as-applied
challenges in discrete cases. 16 5 Justice Ginsburg argued that the pos-
sibility for pre-enforcement, as-applied challenges is the only redemp-
tive aspect of the opinion.166 Doctors and agencies would be able to
mount as-applied challenges "if it can be shown that in discrete and
well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in
which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used" to protect the
health of the woman.167 Citing this language, Justice Ginsburg antic-
ipated that doctors and agencies would swiftly challenge these laws
based on individual instances.168 This permits doctors and advocacy
agencies to mount as-applied challenges based on previous cases
where the law was overbroad. If, as Justice Ginsburg expects, as-ap-
plied challenges are raised, then seemingly few cases would exist
where the law would be overbroad. More precisely, as overbroad por-
tions of a law are severed through the use of as-applied challenges,
few situations will exist where a doctor is put between choosing to pro-
tect a woman's health and following the black letter law.
Finally, in extreme cases, methods of circumventing the overbroad
application of a statute may exist. In Carhart II, for example, the ma-
jority stated, "[i]f the intact D & E procedure is truly necessary in
some circumstances, it appears likely an injection that kills the fetus
judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the woman." Id. at 1641 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
164. If charged under the statute for performing an abortion to protect the health of
the mother, the doctor could argue and would likely win an as-applied challenge
to the statute. The cost of the litigation may also be covered either by advocacy
agencies or pro-choice attorneys willing to do pro bono work.
165. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1651.
167. Id. at 1638.
168. Id. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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is an alternative under the Act that allows the doctor to perform the
procedure." 16 9 This procedure would not be banned under the statute
because the statute specifically refers to "a living fetus.1 7o Abortion
methods circumventing the statute may also prevent doctors from be-
ing put in perilous situations.
Another important aspect of the First Amendment chilling argu-
ment is missing. In the case of abortion, society as a whole is arguably
not as injured by the restriction of constitutional abortions as consti-
tutional speech. One distinction is that the right to privacy is
unenumerated whereas the right to free speech is enumerated in the
First Amendment.17 1 Also, unlike free speech, the "marketplace of
ideas" would not be affected in the same manner by reproductive au-
tonomy rights. Arguably, a democratic society cannot function with-
out the free exchange of ideas. In creating the overbreadth doctrine,
the Court stated that "free and fearless reasoning and communication
of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth" were "es-
sential to effective exercise . . . of popular government."172 The right
to reproductive privacy does not undergird democracy in the same
manner as free speech. Even though reproductive autonomy may al-
low a woman greater reproductive freedom, thereby creating a demo-
cratic society that responds to her reproductive needs, a democratic
society can still function with some limitations on reproductive rights.
While pregnancy or childrearing may burden participation in democ-
racy, they do not preclude it.173
b. Careful Drafting Rationale in Abortion Cases
Numerous arguments have been made regarding the validity of the
judiciary's idea of punishing a legislature for writing an overbroad
law. One criticism of such judicial punishment is that the overbreadth
doctrine application may excessively deter the legislature.174 The leg-
islature may choose to write a statute more narrowly than necessary
and remove applications that are in fact constitutional in fear of a
court's heavy hand.175 Furthermore, consistent judicial punishment
in a certain area might completely deter legislative action in that area
169. Id. at 1637 (majority opinion).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
171. The distinction may indicate the founding fathers' view of the importance of each
right to the young democracy, as they likely enumerated the rights that they
deemed most essential in the Bill of Rights.
172. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
173. In fact, parents seem to be more apt to participate in local democratic functions
such as school boards and parent-teacher organizations. Parents may also be
more likely than non-parents to express interest in larger issues and cases affect-
ing schools and health and safety.
174. Fallon, supra note 36, at 890.
175. Id.
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even if such legislation would be permissible.176 As one commentator
has also noted, many of the landmark free speech cases did not involve
overbreadth.177 It could therefore be argued that landmark cases pro-
tected speech before the advent of overbreadth, and overbreadth is ac-
tually preventing future landmark cases. 178 The arguments for and
against this concept, however, seem identical regardless of whether
the substantive law is free speech or abortion. Although this deter-
rence function of overbreadth seems questionable, it will not be fur-
ther discussed in this section because the argument is not different in
the abortion context. However, overbreadth's deterrence rationale
will be analyzed as to its effect on the shift in federal power.1
7 9
2. Overbreadth Improperly Shifts Power Between Branches
The structure of the United States government is incongruent with
the application of the overbreadth doctrine, particularly in abortion
cases. The overbreadth doctrine shifts power from the legislature to
the judiciary, 18 0 and thereby conflicts with the pillars of American ju-
risprudence and allows courts to seize additional power. Because the
Court has previously afforded itself more power by extending rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, overbreadth's alteration of stand-
ing impermissibly gives the Court too much power.
The Constitution specifically grants jurisdiction for the Court to
review "cases" and "controversies."lSl As the Court has elucidated, it
is limited to "adjudicating rights in particular cases between the liti-
gants."i8 2 Therefore, the Court cannot merely judge the validity of
laws without the presence of dispute.18 3 A similar axiom holds "that
constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicari-
ously."' 8 4 These important standing rules of American jurisprudence
have been altered under the overbreadth doctrine.1S5 While this shift
may be more appropriately viewed as permissible for enumerated
First Amendment rights, standing should not be altered for
unenumerated substantive due process rights. Allowing such a
176. See id.
177. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 152 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 584 U.S. 46 (1988); New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)).
178. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 152-53.
179. This concept will be revisited infra Part III.A.2 to consider the improper effects of
overbreadth in a substantive due process case.
180. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 154.
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
182. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973).
183. Id. at 610-11.
184. Id. at 610.
185. Id. at 611-15.
[Vol. 87:759
"NO SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES"
change would grant the judiciary great power in protecting rights that
are less clearly found in the Constitution.
Deference should also be given to the legislature when interpreting
a statute. The Court has stated, "[iun exercising its power to review
the constitutionality of a legislative Act, a federal court should act
cautiously. A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people." 18 6 Additionally, "[wihere fairly
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of uncon-
stitutionality."18 7 Hence, the Court should prefer severing an uncon-
stitutional application over facial invalidation.
The structural changes associated with overbreadth have led to an
effect previously mentioned: over-deterrence of the legislature's
power. As noted earlier, some commentators applaud the deterrence
effect that overbreadth has on legislatures,188 yet this deterrence also
comes with a cost. Legislatures may become overly careful in drafting
so as to avoid any overbreadth ruling.' 8 9 Thus, the legislature may
choose to narrow the statute beyond what would be constitutionally
necessary.190 Overbreadth, therefore, also has a prophylactic or chil-
ling effect on the legislature. While this effect will likely prevent leg-
islatures from banning constitutionally protected actions, it will also
create scenarios where a legislature wishes to ban a non-constitution-
ally protected action as part of a statute, but, for fear that the entire
statute will become facially invalid, it refuses to do so. Thus, the in-
tent of the representative body of elected officials is subjugated by the
unelected Court. As a result, the United States' separation of powers
between the branches is altered with the judiciary acquiring greater
authority.
The same result occurs in the mere ruling of overbreadth. When a
court holds that a statute is overbroad, it often invalidates a number
of constitutional applications of the law; constitutional aspects of the
law are removed along with the unconstitutional.19 Again, one finds
that actions which the elected body of lawmakers banned, which were
not constitutionally protected, are no longer banned based on the rul-
186. Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).
187. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493
(1983).
188. See supra Part III.A.1.
189. Fallon, supra note 36, at 890 ("Fearful of the consequences of having a statute
declared unconstitutionally overbroad, legislatures may draft laws with over-
abundant caution. If they are intimidated into withholding sanctions even from
constitutionally prohibitable expressive activity . . . legislatures may fail to deal
effectively with pressing social problems.").
190. Id.
191. Id.
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ings of the judiciary. The effect could be a diminished ability of the
legislature to handle social and political issues.1
9 2
The Court has previously described its role under the overbreadth
doctrine as making the legislature "pay" for drafting overbroad legis-
lation,193 and punishing the legislative branch.194 Yet, "when the ju-
diciary starts testing the bounds of its constitutional limitations in the
name of teaching the legislature a lesson, the judiciary seems to forget
its adjudicatory function and views itself as a policymaker."195 By
preventing the legislature from passing constitutional portions of stat-
utes, declaring constitutional parts of statutes unconstitutional, and
punishing the legislature for its drafting, the Court's overbreadth doc-
trine improperly shifts the power of the legislative process.
Although these effects of overbreadth have been generally accepted
for free speech cases, the combination of overbreadth and substantive
due process goes too far. Many people disagree over the validity of
substantive due process.196 What would seem beyond debate, how-
ever, is that the acceptance of substantive due process gives the Court
greater power than would a denial of substantive due process. 19 7 The
Court's detection of unenumerated rights has exactly the same effect
as a constitutional amendment. The Court's holding that the phrase
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"'9 8 grants a substantive right to privacy
binding the government just as much as would a constitutional
amendment for privacy.19 9
Under the Casey standard, the Court uses overbreadth to protect a
substantive due process right. In this abortion case scenario, the
192. Id.
193. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990).
194. Hill, supra note 148, at 1073 ("Meting out wholesale punishment to achieve de-
terrence in these few situations seems injudicious.").
195. Meier, Broad Attack, supra note 27, at 154.
196. Scholars and commentators alike have argued that substantive due process has
no basis in the Constitution. In particular, Justice Scalia has argued, "The entire
practice of using the Due Process Clause to add judicially favored rights to the
limitations upon democracy set forth in the Bill of Rights (usually under the ru-
bric of so-called "substantive due process") is in my view judicial usurpation."
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Thomas A. Glessner, Essay, Curbing Raw Judicial Power: A Proposal for a
Checks and Balances Amendment, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 297, 304 (1999) ("No
doctrine has done more to bootstrap judicial power than that of 'substantive due
process.'").
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
199. The legitimacy of substantive due process has not been discussed and is beyond
the scope of this Note; however, reading implicit rights into the substantive due
process clause grants the judiciary more power to regulate than it would have
absent such interpretation.
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Court starts by acknowledging the fundamental right to privacy. 20 0 It
then applies a test that it developed in response to the right of privacy
and considers whether the statute has an "undue burden" on a wo-
man's right to an abortion.201 When applying the Casey standard, the
Court then determines that the right that it found and defined needs
more protection than standard rights. To give extra protection, the
Court changes the traditional Salerno standard for facial invalidation
and holds that the statute is facially invalid if it is unconstitutional in
large fractions of cases. In determining the fraction of women bur-
dened, the Court has then drawn up a framework that allows for eas-
ier facial invalidation. When the Court has accepted the Casey
standard, it frames the denominator of the fraction to match the nu-
merator and determines that the statute is facially invalid.
The Casey overbreadth standard simply allows the judiciary to mo-
nopolize power in abortion cases by allowing courts to facially invali-
date statutes even if there is only a single infringing application and
most applications are constitutionally permissible. The Court should
not be able to scrap entire statutes and punish legislatures in such a
broad way, particularly when the constitutional right at hand is not
an enumerated right. The shift of power to the courts may be allowa-
ble in the First Amendment context, where the Court has continually
said that there is something special about the enumerated right to
free speech to the function of democracy.20 2 However, the overbreadth
doctrine is not appropriate in the context of the unenumerated abor-
tion context.
3. Overbreadth Cannot Be Properly Applied
The current overbreadth test requires the Court to consider the
number of constitutionally protected applications in light of the total.
The Court wrote, "we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep." 2 0 3 The question then turns to how to
determine whether a statute is substantially overbroad. This then be-
comes the "hard question."204 The answer to the question and the
framing of the statute's sweep could determine the Court's holding.
200. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("The Constitution does not explicitly men-
tion any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, . . . the Court has recog-
nized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.").
201. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
202. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
203. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
204. Fallon, supra note 36, at 893.
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Within the realm of First Amendment overbreadth, the Court has
previously utilized a proportion to determine whether a statute was
substantially overbroad.205 The proportion has typically been the
number of unconstitutional applications of the law compared to the
number of constitutional applications. One commentator has noted
that "this approach calls for uncabined judicial speculation" 20 6 and
goes on to cite examples of Justices applying this test to the same facts
and reaching different results. 20 7 The proper framing of overbreadth
is simply unclear and arguably leads to Justices framing arguments in
accordance with their desired result.
In Carhart II, the Court disagreed on the correct framing of the
overbreadth doctrine, giving further credence to the difficulty in con-
sistent judicial application of such a test. The majority rather off-
handedly noted that respondents have not demonstrated that "the Act
would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases."208
The dissent, however, more precisely stated:
But Casey makes clear that, in determining whether any restriction poses an
undue burden on a "large fraction" of women, the relevant class is not "all
women," nor 'all pregnant women," nor even all women 'seeking abortions."
Rather, a provision restricting access to abortion, "must be judged by refer-
ence to those women for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant
restriction."
2 0 9
Thus, in the present case, the Justices also applied the same standard
to the same facts and came to different results, undoubtedly due to
their framings of the issue. The ambiguity and leeway in framing the
issue could allow the Justices to decide cases according to their moral
convictions or gut feelings apart from the rules of law. This allows the
Court to decide any Casey standard problem according to the whims of
the slim majority, without constraint on the Justices' rationale. 2 10
This seems to contradict the idea that courts should make decisions
based on rules of law and not on their personal moral beliefs.
A closer look into how the large-fraction test has been framed
shows that when the Court actually relies on Casey, it frames the test
205. Id. at 894 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989), where Justices
Brennan and Scalia agreed that the law was overbroad but disagreed over
whether it was substantially overbroad).
206. Id. at 894.
207. Id.
208. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
209. Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)) (citations omitted).
210. Certainly no one, except for possibly the Justices themselves, can speak as to the
Justices' true rationale in framing a Casey problem. However, it seems un-
remarkable to think that a Justice's beliefs regarding the overarching abortion
issue play a large role in that Justice's determination of the correct standard,
even if unwittingly.
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as Justice Ginsburg illustrated in the dissent of Carhart 11.211 Yet,
Justice Ginsburg's framing leads to an unusual result. Because Jus-
tice Ginsburg would say that the statute burdens all women to whom
it is relevant, 2 12 the fraction would equal one and the statute would be
considered overbroad.
2 13
However, a truly odd result perpetuates from the framing sug-
gested by Justice Ginsburg. This common framing leads to the conclu-
sion that if all applications of a statute are constitutional except one
type, then the law would still be facially invalid. Even if there was
only one possible unconstitutional application in a sea of constitu-
tional applications, this framing would suggest that both the numera-
tor and the denominator of the large-fraction test should consist of the
one unconstitutional application. Hence, this framing requires every
application to be a constitutional application. Notably, this framing of
Casey is the antithesis of Salerno, which states that a law is facially
invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.
The results of the typical framing of Casey are highly incongruent
with the notion of American jurisprudence. Traditionally, courts
should attempt to save a statute and interpret a statute to avoid un-
constitutionality. The common framework of Casey does the exact op-
posite and repudiates a law if there is only one unconstitutional
application. Thus, the Salerno rule is preferable. So long as there is
at least one constitutional application, the facial challenge will fail.
Thus, the overall intent of the elected body is enforced, but as-applied
challenges are still allowed so that constitutional rights remain pro-
tected. Further, the Salerno rule is easy to apply; no tricky balancing
test is necessary. Salerno also leaves less room for Justices to alter
the test so as to give effect to their moral beliefs.
B. The Roberts Court Will Likely Reject Overbreadth in
Abortion
Multiple facial challenges to abortion legislation have arisen dur-
ing the recent decades. 2 14 If recent history continues, the Roberts
211. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
The majority in Carhart II never relied on Casey and also did not indicate their
framing of the large-fraction test.
212. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1651 n.10.
214. Cases in recent decades are included in the following list, which is far from all-
encompassing: 1970s: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); 1980s: City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747(1986); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989); 1990s: Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 2000s: Carhart I, 530
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Court may very well soon face another facial challenge to an abortion
statute. The question then arises: what standard will the Roberts
Court adopt for facial challenges in the abortion context? The answer
to this question is more than a scholarly exercise-after all, such pre-
dictions can serve as an important guide to Congress and legislatures
across the country, each of which certainly has need of knowing which
standard would likely apply in order to formulate legislation within
constitutional bounds. By identifying the likely standard, a legisla-
ture would be better able to pass acts that are both constitutional and
match the wishes of the representatives and constituents. 2 15
Making an accurate prediction of what standard the Roberts Court
might adopt is difficult.216 However, the Justices' proclivities can be
determined based on their previous statements and holdings. In Jan-
klow, certain Justices tipped their hands to what standard they might
adopt. 2 17 In the memorandum denying certiorari in an abortion case,
Justice Stevens discussed his belief that the no-set-of-circumstances
test of Salerno was merely dicta, was not supported by precedent, and
was not the correct test for facial challenges. 2 18 From his statements,
it is clear that Justice Stevens does not believe that Salerno is the
correct test outside of the abortion context, let alone within it.
In the dissent of Janklow, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehn-
quist and Thomas, wrote that Casey "did not purport to change [the]
well-established rule [of Salerno] ."219 Furthermore, the dissent com-
mented that the Court incorrectly accepted the lower court's applica-
tion of the Casey standard without ever deciding the correct
standard. 220 In a separate abortion case, Justice Scalia stated that
the lower court's finding of unconstitutionality seemed incorrect be-
U.S. 914 (2000); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 540 U.S. 320
(2006); Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
215. For example, if an act's scope could be interpreted to encompass a small protected
group, under the overbreadth doctrine, the legislature would have to worry that
such legislation would be invalidated by the courts. However, if the Salerno rule
seems most likely to apply, the legislature has more assurance that statutes,
even if interpreted broadly to encompass many people, will not be facially struck
down.
216. The possibility certainly exists that the Roberts Court as currently assembled
will not hear another abortion facial challenge case. This Note, however, focuses
on the Roberts Court's likely determination because it is the sole Court whose
membership is known. Furthermore, the Note's analysis of the particular Jus-
tices' views may continue to be insightful even if the composition of the Court
were to change.
217. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996) (Ste-
vens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari).
218. Id. at 1175.
219. Id. at 1179 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) (quoting Ada v.
Guam Soc. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1013 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari)).
220. Id. at 1177-80.
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cause there were some valid applications of the law. 22 1 Justice Scalia
indicated that certiorari should have been granted so the Salerno test
could be applied instead of the overbreadth doctrine.2 22
The Court's failure to reach four votes to grant certiorari in Ada
may also indicate that the Justices view Casey as the correct standard.
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas all voted not to re-
view the case. 22 3 Justice Thomas's acceptance of the Casey standard,
however, would be surprising in light of his Janklow dissent. One
commentator has previously noted that the Janklow majority's "si-
lence concerning the doctrine speaks volumes" because none of the
Justices even questioned whether Casey was the correct standard.2 24
Another commentator has argued that the fact that Justices Kennedy
and Souter joined the opinion of Casey indicates that they rejected the
Salerno test in abortion cases.22 5
Justice Souter's preference of the overbreadth doctrine in abortion
cases was also seen in a denial of a motion for injunction.226 Justice
Souter, by joining the concurrence written by Justice O'Connor, indi-
cated that he believed the lower courts incorrectly applied the Salerno
rule rather than the Casey standard.2 27 The memorandum states his
opinion that the Casey rule should be applied whenever a case reviews
a law restricting abortion.228
Previous case law has provided little information in determining
whether the newer Justices would apply the doctrine. However, Car-
hart II, in the context of previous decisions, may indicate how the
Court is likely to rule. In abortion cases leading up to Carhart II, the
Court has usually applied the overbreadth doctrine.22 9 In Carhart II,
the Court went to great lengths to state that the standard of a chal-
lenge for abortion statutes is open to review and unclear.230 The Car-
hart II majority could have easily applied the Casey test and arrived
at the same result. Instead, the Court carefully pointed out that the
issue remains unresolved. 23 1 The majority's rationale might reflect
an unwillingness to accept or apply the overbreadth doctrine in the
221. Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Decker, supra note 57, at 92.
225. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Con-
stitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 156 (1998).
226. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993); Wharton, supra
note 79, at 351-52.
227. Schafer, 507 U.S. at 1013-14.
228. Id.
229. See supra Part II.C.2.
230. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
231. Id.
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abortion context. 2 32 The majority also stated, "[tihe latitude given fa-
cial challenges in the First Amendment context is inapplicable
here."2 33 The overbreadth doctrine is exactly the "latitude" of which
the Court speaks; consequently, this statement seems to imply the
majority's belief that the overbreadth doctrine has no place in review-
ing abortion statutes.
Moreover, the Court's half-hearted attempt to apply the Casey test
indicates the majority's contempt for the large-fraction test. When the
Court has previously considered the large-fraction overbreadth test, it
has carefully articulated its reasons in defining the denominator a cer-
tain way and stated that the statute "must be judged by reference to
those [women] for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant re-
striction."234 In Carhart II, however, the Court just noted the denomi-
nator that the Court chose 23 5 without considering whether its choice
aligned with precedent.
236
Therefore, if the Roberts Court is presented with a case in which it
must decide the correct burden for a facial challenge in an abortion
case, the Court would most likely split five to four in favor of applying
the Salerno rule. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg are
likely to argue the applicability of the overbreadth doctrine, whereas
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Roberts, would probably argue for
Salerno. In such a decision, Justice Kennedy is likely to continue his
consistent role as the vital swing vote on the Roberts Court.
237 Al-
232. It could aptly be argued that the Court may have left the standard unresolved in
order to reach a majority rather than a plurality opinion if it had applied Casey.
While this is also a sensible conclusion, it is less convincing when viewed in light
of Carhart I as a whole. Within Carhart II, the majority states that it "assumes"
principles of Casey and applies "its standards to the cases at bar." Id. at 1626-27.
This appears to be the majority's method of applying precedent without consider-
ing whether the members of the majority concur with the precedent. The major-
ity could have easily done the same thing in regard to the standard. While the
majority indicated that the standard was unclear, all recent cases had applied a
standard more akin to Casey. Further, the majority cites the pre-Casey case of
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). Instead of
taking the same approach of assuming the dominant standards as it did earlier,
the majority specifically states that the correct standard is unclear. Therefore,
the majority's wording is much more likely to be indicating disapproval of the
current standard rather than merely trying to avoid a plurality opinion.
233. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
234. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
235. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 ("We note that the statute here applies to all in-
stances in which the doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not merely
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though previous cases indicate that Justice Kennedy might apply
overbreadth, the opinion of Carhart II, authored by Justice Kennedy
himself, seems a more authoritative and persuasive hint at his view.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy appears likely to lead the Court to a five
to four split rejecting the overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases.
This prediction is highly congruent with an observed trend within
the Roberts Court to issue opinions that "lean heavily toward as-ap-
plied challenges" rather than facial invalidations. 238 Utilizing the
more stringent Salerno rule, the Roberts Court would, in practice, pre-
clude facial challenges to abortion regulations that rely on hypotheti-
cal burdens or harms to hypothetical parties, encouraging parties
instead to bring as-applied challenges as they arise.
If indeed the Court does reject the overbreadth doctrine in abor-
tion, the number of facial challenges would be drastically reduced. Fa-
cial challenges could no longer be brought to challenge laws that ban
both constitutionally and non-constitutionally protected actions. In-
stead, facial challenges would be limited to statutes containing struc-
tural errors, in which the statutes are valid under no set of
circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although much uproar accompanied the announcement of the Car-
hart II decision, its practical effect on abortions is likely to be inconse-
quential. The real importance of the case is found in the minutia;
within the details, one finds that the majority questioned whether the
Casey or Salerno test should be used in abortion cases. By contem-
plating the appropriate standard, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance the standard may hold in future cases. Indeed, the most
important effect of Carhart II may be the shift away from the Casey
standard that it signals.
This Note has argued that the traditional rationales for over-
breadth are not convincing in the abortion context, that Casey improp-
erly shifts power between branches of the government, and that the
Justices are unlikely to be able to impartially apply the large-fraction
test. Thus, the use of the overbreadth doctrine in the abortion context
opinions issued. Because the court so far has shown itself to be strikingly-and
evenly-divided on ideological issues, Kennedy holds enormous power in pivoting
between the left and right, legal experts say. He stands alone in the middle-and
that enhances his importance."); Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, The Power
Broker: In an Exclusive Interview, Justice Kennedy Discusses Life, Center Stage,
NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2007, at 36 ("In 19 cases during the past year, the Supreme
Court split down the middle along ideological lines.... Each time, the tie was
broken by a fifth vote belonging to Justice Anthony Kennedy.").
238. Edward A. Harnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735,
1756 (2006).
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is simply inappropriate. In an arena so filled with emotional fervor,
the ambiguous and esoteric large-fraction test allows framing accord-
ing to the whims of the Justices. A court system that decides cases,
which are emotionally and morally important to millions across the
nation, differently based on a continually changing Court composition
will certainly lose the faith of the American people. To prevent the
morals of Justices, rather than constitutional mandates, from seeping
into the judiciary's decisions, the Court should refrain from facially
invalidating a law instituted by an elected, representative body unless
no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.
A future holding by the Roberts Court choosing the applicable
standard in abortion might be anticipated. Many of the Justices' lean-
ings towards the correct standard for abortion facial challenges can be
discovered through a review of Supreme Court case law. However, the
simple fact that the Carhart II majority considered which standard to
apply rather than just assuming a Casey precedent suggests that the
majority was not comfortable with the more widely and recently ap-
plied Casey test. Thus, the best indicator that the Roberts Court will
likely apply the Salerno standard in the future is its implied reluc-
tance to accept Casey as precedent for facial changes.
On the outset of the opinion, the majority accepted the principles of
Casey as precedent, yet strikingly, it refused to apply the large-frac-
tion test outright. The majority's aberration in handling the standard
of review demonstrates the majority's uneasiness in using the Casey
standard and likely signals an impending evolution in the Court's
holdings. Because the Court's determination of the correct burden
will drastically affect both challengers and defenders of abortion stat-
utes, the Court's forthcoming choice of the correct standard becomes
vitally important.
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